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(RE)EMPOWERING THE COMMUNITY: A CASE STUDY OF
NAMIBIA’S LEGAL EVOLUTION OF WILDLIFE
GOVERNANCE
STEFAN CARPENTER*

Throughout much of the twentieth century, wildlife management
found in Sub-Saharan Africa mirrored that found across the globe—
primarily relying on a “fortress-model” approach of demarcated protected
areas, nationalization of wildlife, and bans on the hunting or utilization of
protected species.1 This approach has deep historical roots, beginning with
the setting aside of certain hunting ground for elites of the Roman Empire2
and continuing through the assertion of sovereign ownership over wildlife
within Europe’s Medieval and Renaissance kingdoms.3 The modern form
of the approach, starting with the creation of Yellowstone National Park
in 1872, involves the use of national parks (along with wildlife refuges and
other governmental protected areas).4 However, beginning in the 1960s
and 1970s, countries in southern Africa began experimenting with devolving control over wildlife resources—first to private landholders and subsequently to communities located in communally owned lands.5
These experiments coincided with the rise of the “Washington Consensus” in the 1980s—a neoliberal development policy that emphasized
*

PhD, JD, Assistant Professor at Florida Gulf Coast University, The Water School.
Stefan Carpenter, The Devolution of Conservation: Why CITES Must Embrace Community-Based Resource Management, 2 ARIZ. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2011); Rowan Martin,
When CITES Works and When it Does Not, in ENDANGERED SPECIES, THREATENED CONVENTION: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CITES 29, 29–37 (John Hutton & Barnabas
Dickson eds., 2000).
2
Thomas Fischer, Hunting in the Roman period, in HUNTING IN NORTHERN EUROPE
UNTIL 1500 AD: OLD TRADITIONS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, CONTINENTAL SOURCES
AND CONTINENTAL INFLUENCES 259, 260–61 (Oliver Grimm & Ulrich Schmölcke eds., 2011).
3
Michael Wolfe, The History of German Game Administration, 14 FOREST HIST. NEWSL.
6, 10 (1970); John Fletcher, The Impact of Hunting on European Woodland from Medieval
to Modern Times, in THE IMPACT OF HUNTING ON EUROPEAN WOODLAND FROM MEDIEVAL
TO MODERN TIMES 116, 117–18 (Keith Kirby & Charles Watkins eds., 2015).
4
Wolfram Dressler et al., From Hope to Crisis and Back Again? A Critical History of the
Global CBNRM Narrative, 5 ENV’T CONSERVATION 5, 6 (2010).
5
INT’L INST. ENV’T DEV., COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN AFRICA:
IMPACTS, EXPERIENCES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 6–7 (Dilys Roe et al. eds., 2009); Brian
Child & Grenville Barnes, The Conceptual Evolution and Practice of Community-Based
Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa: Past, Present and Future, 37 ENV’T
CONSERVATION 283, 284–85 (2010).
1
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the free market and limited involvement by the state.6 The resulting devolution of wildlife management rights to rural communities—often
referred to as either Community-Based Natural Resource Management
(“CBNRM”) or Community-Based Conservation (“CBC”) (the term used
herein)—marked a notable shift from the paternalistic and increasingly
rigid wildlife management policy favored by the countries’ prior colonial
rulers.7 The CBC approach has had both notable successes and failures,
and it has been criticized on both theoretical and practical grounds.8
Among other things, states, NGOs, and local officials are often reluctant
to fully devolve control over wildlife resources to the local communities.9
Nevertheless, it remains a popular and widely utilized wildlife governance approach, particularly in the global south.10
Namibia exemplifies the struggle to adopt effective wildlife governance in that it has, throughout its colonial and post-colonial history,
implemented some of the world’s most notable national parks and CBC
efforts. Its national parks are generally successful from a wildlife conservation standpoint, but their formation was often part of a systematized
effort to marginalize the country’s Black population, and they provide
little economic or institutional benefits to local populations.11 Namibia
has aggressively pursued a formal CBC program, and some of the areas
under that governance have obtained notable successes.12 Yet many have
6

INT’L INST. ENV’T DEV., supra note 5, at 7; Washington Consensus, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Washington-consensus [https://perma.cc
/PZF3-J9L3] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
7
INT’L INST. ENV’T DEV., supra note 5, at 6–7.
8
W.M. Adams & D. Hulme, If Community Conservation Is the Answer in Africa, What Is
the Question?, 35 ORYX 193, 195–97 (2001); Brian Child, Community Conservation in
Southern Africa: Rights-Based Natural Resource Management, in EVOLUTION AND INNOVATION IN WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: PARKS AND GAME RANCHES TO TRANSFRONTIER
CONSERVATION AREAS 187, 187–88 (Helen Suich et al. eds., 2009); Marshall W. Murphree,
The Strategic Pillars of Communal Natural Resource Management: Benefit, Empowerment
and Conservation, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2551, 2552–53 (2009); Dressler et
al., supra note 4, at 5–6; J. S. Gruber, Key Principles of Community-Based Natural Resource Management: A Synthesis and Interpretation of Identified Effective Approaches for
Managing the Commons, 45 ENV’T MGMT. 52, 52–53 (2010).
9
CLARK GIBSON, POLITICIANS AND POACHERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WILDLIFE
POLICY IN AFRICA 119 (1999); INT’L INST. ENV’T DEV., supra note 5, at viii–ix; Piers
Blaikie, Is Small Really Beautiful? Community-Based Natural Resource Management in
Malawi and Botswana, 34 WORLD DEV. 1942, 1945 (2006).
10
Gruber, supra note 8, at 52.
11
Ute Dieckmann, The Vast White Place: A History of the Etosha National Park in Namibia
and the Hai//Om, 5 NOMADIC PEOPLES 125, 125 (2001).
12
Karol C. Boudreaux, Community Conservation in Namibia: Devolution as a Tool for the
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struggled to meet some or all of their conservation and development
goals.13 In short, Namibia serves as a parable for many of the challenges
faced by developing countries attempting to craft wildlife policy that balances the immediate needs of its rural—and generally poor—populations
while sustainably managing their wildlife resources.
This Article will introduce the theoretical foundation of the CBC
approach. It will then use Namibia as a case study to both: (a) illustrate
the sort of historical, political, and economic drivers that motivate the
adoption of CBC across the global south, and (b) highlight the existence
of potential structural weaknesses present in even the most lauded CBC
programs. Finally, this Article will present some of the common theoretical and results-based criticisms of CBC and discuss broader lessons that
can be drawn from the Namibian experience. The analyses in this Article
draw from academic literature, Namibia’s statutes and Constitution, and
the Stefan Carpenter’s original field research in four conservancies (CBC
areas) located in Namibia’s northwestern Kunene region.
I.

CBC: DEVOLUTION OF CONTROL AND REALIZATION OF BENEFITS

At its core, the CBC approach calls for a degree of empowerment
of local communities to manage wildlife stocks found within their own
territories,14 and it is premised on the concept that local populations will
be incentivized to actively participate in wildlife conservation efforts
when they can manage the resource and share in the resulting profits.15
Child and Barnes observe that the term refers to both an aspirational
ideal and real-world implementation of the approach.16 However, much
as is the case with other aspirational terms such as “democracy,” there is
not a universal agreement about the range of governance approaches that
should fall under the label of “CBC.”17 The term is used in different regions
of the globe to refer to a range of approaches that can vary significantly
Legal Empowerment of the Poor 1–2 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr. Working Paper
No. 10-64, 2010).
13
Id. at 2–8.
14
Derek Armitage, Adaptive Capacity and Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 35 ENV’T MGMT. 703, 704; Gruber, supra note 8, at 53.
15
Frik de Beer, Community-Based Natural Resource Management: Living with Alice in
Wonderland?, 48 CMTY. DEV. J. 555, 565 (2012).
16
Child & Barnes, supra note 5, at 283. Child and Barnes refer to “CBNRM” in their paper.
17
Child, supra note 8, at 187; Murphree, supra note 8, at 2553; Child & Barnes, supra
note 5, at 283; Gruber, supra note 8, at 52; Thomas G. Measham & Jared A. Lumbasi,
Success Factors for Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM): Lessons
from Kenya and Australia, ENV’T MGMT. 649, 650 (2013).
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in conceptualization and design.18 This Article examines the form of CBC
that evolved out of southern Africa, which primarily focuses on wildlife
governance and which Child describes as a “shorthand for a set of economic, political, and organizational principles within a strongly devolutionary rights-based approach.”19
The aspirational goals of the CBC approach represent the interests of myriad different stakeholders. The approach is alternately (and
often simultaneously) viewed as a mechanism for: (a) the empowerment
and economic development of rural communities, (b) the formal recognition of local knowledge and culture, or (c) a more effective approach for
the conservation of natural resources.20 The approach rests on two core
assumptions. The first is that local populations have a greater potential
for the sustainable use of resources than does the state.21 Part of this potential lies in the fact that, in theory, local communities are more aware
of local environmental and ecological conditions.22 Local communities may
also have their own institutions—formal or informal—that are better
suited than equivalent national institutions at facilitating the sustainable use of wildlife resources.23
The second assumption is that, if they receive an enduring interest
in and are able to control and profit from wildlife resources, communities
will govern those resources in a sustainable manner in order to ensure
the availability of future benefits.24 In this respect, CBC functions as an
economics-based approach.25 Simply put, the approach holds that people
18

Adams & Hulme, supra note 8, at 194; Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay et al., Benefits to
Local Communities from Community Conservancies in Namibia: An Assessment, 26 DEV.
S. AFR. 733, 734 (2009); Child, supra note 8, at 188.
19
Child, supra note 8, at 187. See also Adams & Hulme, supra note 8, at 193; Child &
Barnes, supra note 5, at 283.
20
Armitage, supra note 14, at 703; Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing et al., Introduction: Raising
Questions about Communities and Conservation, in COMMUNITIES AND CONSERVATION:
HISTORIES AND POLITICS OF COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1–2
(Peter Brosius et al. eds., 2005); Child, supra note 8, at 188; Child & Barnes, supra note
5, at 283; Gruber, supra note 8, at 53.
21
Tsing et al., supra note 20, at 1; Dressler et al., supra note 4, at 5.
22
Tsing et al., supra note 20, at 1; Blaikie, supra note 9, at 1942; Michael Cox et al., A
Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 15
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 38, 39–40 (2010).
23
Tsing et al., supra note 20, at 1.
24
Alexander Songorwa et al., Community-Based Wildlife Management in Africa: A
Critical Assessment of the Literature, 40 NAT. RES. J. 603, 613 (2000); J. A. Silva & A. W.
Mosimane, Conservation-Based Rural Development in Namibia: A Mixed-Methods Assessment of Economic Benefits, 22 J. ENV’T & DEV. 25, 26 (2012).
25
Andrew Lyons, The Rise and Fall of a Second-Generation CBNRM Project in Zambia:
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will sustainably manage their resources when the perceived benefits of
doing so outweigh the perceived costs.26 Wildlife can potentially generate
income through tourism, trophy hunting, and harvesting for live sale or
bushmeat, and smaller game species, such as deer, bushpig, or rabbit,
can provide critical supplemental income in the form of meat for consumption or trade.27
On the other hand, wildlife of all types can inflict substantial personal or economic harm on rural populations. Most rural populations rely
on some form of agriculture or pastoralism for their primary source of
income.28 Wildlife conflict can impact such populations in a multitude of
ways, including livestock predation, crop-raiding, destruction of food stores,
attacks on humans, disease transmission (to both crops and humans),
and foregone economic or lifestyle choices due to either the presence of
wildlife or restrictions related to conservation areas.29 Large carnivores
are especially likely to be involved in human-wildlife conflict (“HWC”)
because of their expansive home ranges and their dietary requirements.30
For subsistence and small-scale farmers and pastoralists, the
economic losses resulting from HWC can be devastating.31 Lamarque, et
al., observe that, for some of these residents, “losses to wildlife can mean
the difference between economic independence and dire poverty.”32 And,
given that the official records of HWC reflect only overt human-wildlife
conflict, and not more passive conflict resulting from disease transmission
(such as rabies, anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease) or impact on livelihood
choices (such as the loss of grazing or foraging territory resulting from
the threat of overt wildlife conflict or the loss of schooling opportunities
by children tasked with guarding crops), the true economic impact of
HWC is likely even greater.33
Insights from a Project Perspective, 51 J. ENV’T MGMT. 365, 367 (2013).
26
Murphree, supra note 8, at 2554.
27
Id. at 2555, 2557.
28
Songorwa et al., supra note 24, at 622–23.
29
A. J. Dickman, Complexities of Conflict: The Importance of Considering Social Factors for
Effectively Resolving Human-Wildlife Conflict, 13 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 458, 458 (2010).
30
Muhammad Kabir et al., Assessment of Human-Leopard Conflict in Machiara National
Park, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, 60 EUROPEAN J. WILDLIFE RSCH. 291, 291
(2014).
31
F. LAMARQUE ET AL., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., UN, HUMAN-WILDLIFE CONFLICT IN AFRICA:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 27 (2009).
32
Id. at 11.
33
See generally Maan Barua et al., The Hidden Dimensions of Human-Wildlife Conflict:
Health Impacts, Opportunity and Transaction Costs, 157 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 309,
309 (2013).

316

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:311

To address the fact that wildlife conservation exposes participants
to an increased likelihood of HWC, formal CBC policies are often designed
to provide communities with economic benefits.34 However, participants
can also have non-economic incentives associated with CBC participation,
such as a sense of pride associated with management activity, enjoyment
from observing wildlife, or (as will be discussed later in this Article) the
feeling of having regained a degree of ownership and autonomy previously
lost under colonial administration.35 Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that seeking to increase the value of wildlife to communities does
not alone mean that a program utilizes a CBC approach. The approach
requires the presence of both benefits and of the devolution of control
over the wildlife resources.36
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAMIBIA’S CBC PROGRAM: FROM TRIBES
TO CONSERVANCIES

Thirty-nine percent of Namibia’s total land area (home to approximately two-thirds of the country’s population) currently falls under communal ownership, where ownership is legally recognized as collectively
belonging to the “traditional communities” of the area in which it is located,
and permanent individual ownership rights are generally prohibited.37
Namibia has embraced the implementation of CBC in these communal
areas, and its program is frequently held up as one of the world’s flagship
examples of CBC success in promoting wildlife conservation.38 CBC
features prominently in tourism marketing materials for the country.39
34

Child, supra note 8, at 188; Murphree, supra note 8, at 2551.
Brian Jones & Chris Weaver, CBNRM in Namibia: Growth, Trends, Lessons and Constraints, in EVOLUTION & INNOVATION IN WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: PARKS AND GAME
RANCHES TO TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS 223, 234–35 (Helen Suich & Brian
Child eds., 2009).
36
Brian Child & Martha West Lyman, Introduction to NATURAL RESOURCES AS COMMUNITY ASSETS: LESSONS FROM TWO CONTINENTS 1, 1 (Brian Child & Martha West Lyman
eds., 2005).
37
Namibia, USAID (Oct. 2010), https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/namibia/#15
29257975757-7d5ef4da-df61 [https://perma.cc/UT9R-D423]; Communal Land Reform Act
of 2002, 2787 Gov’t Gazette of the Republic of Namib. 2 (2002).
38
In one example of such praise, the WWF wrote a 2011 article titled “Namibia: how
communities led a conservation success story.” See Namibia: How Communities Led a
Conservation Success Story, WWF (Apr. 12, 2011), http://wwf.panda.org/?200002/Namibia
-how-communities-led-a-conservation-success-story [https://perma.cc/267C-M5BN].
39
Conservation, NAMIB. TOURISM BD., https://namibiatourism.com.na/page/conservation
[https://perma.cc/4VWX-KSW8] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022); Damaraland Camp, WILDERNESS
SAFARIS, https://wilderness-safaris.com/our-camps/camps/damaraland-camp [https://
perma.cc/VA8R-NDAK] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
35
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For instance, the official website of the Namibia Tourism Board describes
Namibia’s implementation of CBC as “facilitating a remarkable recovery
of wildlife,” and notes that this recovery “has led some to call Namibia’s
conservation effort the greatest African wildlife recovery story ever told.”40
Similarly, Wilderness Safaris (a high-end tourism company with numerous tourist lodges spread across seven African countries) writes that its
Damaraland Camp is the “successful result” of a partnership with the
Torra Conservancy (located in Namibia’s northwest Kunene region) that
“has become an inspiration for communities and conservationists throughout Africa.”41
CBC in Namibia, however, is not merely an alternate approach to
effectuating wildlife governance, but it also represents an attempt to combat the grossly inequitable legacy of Namibia’s colonial and apartheid
past.42 Through the creation of its conservancy program, the post-colonial
Namibian government expressly sought to empower rural communities
that had long been denied economic and administrative opportunities
under German and South African rule.43
A.

Pre-Colonial Governance in Namibia and Germany

1.

Namibia: A Patchwork System of Governance and the Impact
of Rinderpest

Little is written on pre-colonial environmental management in
Namibia. Nevertheless, a limited number of writings provide an idea of
what environmental governance in Namibia may have looked like prior
to European colonization.44 Across Sub-Saharan Africa generally, societies
used social, rather than ecological, management systems.45 These systems
restricted access to natural resources through hierarchical social structures, often based on clanship, families, or religious authority, and sometimes imposed hunting limits on certain types of game species or young
or pregnant animals.46 Hunting limitations were not driven by ecological
40

NAMIB. TOURISM BD., supra note 39.
WILDERNESS SAFARIS, supra note 39.
42
Paul DeGeorges & Brian Reilly, The Realities of Community Based Natural Resource
Management and Biodiversity Conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1 SUSTAINABILITY 734,
735 (2009).
43
Id. at 734.
44
Id. at 735.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 736.
41
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concerns, but rather considerations such as the need to conserve game
resources for future hunting, personal or societal preferences or taboos,
or limits in hunting technology.47 In highly centralized societies, ruling
families sometimes imposed hunting restrictions through the demarcation of their own personal hunting grounds.48 On the other hand, hunting
was also a tool used by pastoral and agricultural communities to protect
their livestock and crops by limiting populations of certain wildlife species.49
It appears that the governance approaches used throughout SubSaharan Africa were also present in at least some of the pre-colonial areas
of Namibia.50 The Ovambos, located in northern Namibia and presentday south Angola, were organized into chiefdoms in which royal families
held a degree of ownership over land and resources.51 As such, the Ovambo
chiefs had the capacity to implement some degree of limitations on wildlife
utilization.52 For instance, an Ovambo chiefdom established a traditional
royal hunting ground that encompassed parts of the current Etosha National Park.53 In many Ovambo kingdoms, subjects were forbidden from
hunting until after the conclusion of the king’s ceremonial hunt at the beginning of the dry season, at which point the wildlife had already given
birth.54 Large game such as elephants were often regarded as belonging to
the Ovambo kings, who hunted the species in order to elevate their status.55
The Nama and the San, lacking the strong chiefdoms of the
Ovambo, instead appear to have had more informal restrictions on hunting in the form of taboos and norms regarding the consumption of certain
wildlife species.56 In a 1928 account of the Nama, the German missionary
Heinrich Vedder noted, “a real Nama never eats the flesh of a wild dog,
a monkey, a hyena, jackal, a lion or a hare. He believes the meat of these
47

Id.; Munyardzi Manyanga & George Pangeti, Precolonial Hunting in Southern Africa:
A Changing Paradigm, in ARCHIVES,OBJECTS,PLACES AND LANDSCAPES:MULTIDISCIPLINARY
APPROACHES TO DECOLONISED ZIMBABWEAN PAST 277, 284 (Munyaradzi Manyanga &
Shadreck Chirikure eds., 2017).
48
Manyanga & Pangeti, supra note 47, at 285.
49
Id.
50
C. H. L. HAHN ET AL., THE NATIVE TRIBES OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA 18–19 (1928).
51
Id.; MARTII EIROLA, THE OVAMBOGEFAHR: THE OVAMBOLAND RESERVATION IN THE MAKING 45–50 (1992).
52
HAHN ET AL., supra note 50, at 34–35.
53
M. LINDEQUE, ELEPHANT CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT PLAN (Conservation Ministry
of Wildlife & Tourism ed., 1991).
54
HARRI OLAVI SIISKONEN, TRADE AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE IN OVAMBOLAND 1850–1906
58–59 (1990); MANFRED HINZ, WITHOUT CHIEFS THERE WOULD BE NO GAME: CUSTOMARY
LAW AND NATURE CONSERVATION 16 (2003).
55
SIISKONEN, supra note 54, at 60.
56
HAHN ET AL., supra note 50, at 127–29, 143–44.
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animals to be impure and injurious to health. But this custom is also
slowly disappearing.”57 Similarly, in an ethnographic study conducted over
a series of expeditions between 1950 and 1961, Marshall observed that
the San people in Namibia’s Nyae Nyae region did not eat many species
of wildlife found in the area.58 Some (such as foxes, shrews, genets, some
small wildcats, gerbils, bats, and a variety of snakes, birds and insects)
were apparently not ordinarily considered to be food.59 Other animals
were viewed as repugnant, and the people whom Marshall interviewed
stated that they would rather die of starvation than eat them.60 The latter
category of animals consisted primarily of predators and scavengers
(lion, leopard, cheetah, hyena, aardwolf, wild dog, and vulture) but also
included flamingo, chameleon, mongoose, meerkat, and squirrel.61
As a result of human activity, including hunting and livestock grazing, Africa was not generally dominated by wildlife as is often depicted
in popular imagery today.62 Rather, the landscape in many places was
dominated by cattle and goats, with minimal bush cover.63 The arrival of
rinderpest in Africa drastically reduced the impact of human activity on
wildlife populations.64
In 1891, an outbreak of rinderpest occurred among cattle on
Kilimanjaro.65 Six years later, in 1897, the disease reached Namibia,
spreading across the area within a matter of weeks.66 Rinderpest had a
devastating impact on native African populations, including those in
Namibia, and a profound impact on its landscape.67 Namibia’s Herero
people lost as many as ninety-five percent of their cattle—a number that
mirrors the percentage of cattle losses across Africa as a whole.68 It also
decimated other types of livestock, as well as wildlife populations of buffalo, giraffe, eland, small antelopes, and warthogs.69

57

Id. at 129.
LORNA MARSHALL, THE !KUNG OF NYAE NYAE 124 (1976).
59
Id. at 126.
60
Id. at 127.
61
Id. at 127.
62
Robert Nelson, Environmental Colonialism: “Saving” Africa from Africans, 8 INDEP.
REV. 65, 65 (2003).
63
Id. at 72, 74–75; DeGeorges & Reilly, supra note 42, at 752.
64
Nelson, supra note 62, at 72.
65
Thomas Ofcansky, The 1889–97 Rinderpest Epidemic and the Rise of British and German
Colonialism in Eastern and Southern Africa, 8 J. AFR. STUD. 31, 31 (1981).
66
Id. at 31–32.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 36; DeGeorges & Reilly, supra note 42, at 737.
69
Nelson, supra note 62, at 72.
58
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Whereas the presence of livestock and herbivorous wildlife had
previously encouraged the growth of grassland, the lack of grazing in the
aftermath of rinderpest allowed for the encroachment of bush which, in
turn, provided habitat for the tsetse fly.70 The resulting outbreaks of sleeping sickness limited the recovery of livestock but not of wildlife, which were
immune to the disease.71 Absent competition from livestock, wildlife populations quickly rebounded.72 A countryside predominated by bush and
wildlife was a marked departure from the historical status quo but, “[f]or
European conservationists, typically ignorant of the recent ecological history of the continent, this landscape appeared to be the ‘true Africa’ of
wild game.”73
2.

Germany: From Royal Hunting to the Conservation of Nature

During the time of the Roman Empire, no known widespread
formal legal restrictions on hunting existed within the territories that
comprise current-day Germany, with hunting being allowed even on private lands.74 However, the hunting of certain species was considered an
elite pastime, and there is evidence that imperial hunting grounds were
created in which general hunting was prohibited.75 For example, the city
of Trier is believed to have had an imperial hunting grounds that encompassed an area of approximately 220 square kilometers.76
The Germanic tribes gained hegemony in western Europe in the
late fourth century.77 Wolfe provides a detailed account of the development of wildlife governance among the Germanic people.78 Initially, the
tribes likely lacked any restrictions on wildlife use other than those
related to religious taboos.79 The Germanic Codes from the sixth century
contained some limited restrictions on wildlife capture, but the Codes
largely addressed the methods used for hunting rather than imposing
any seasonal restrictions or species protections.80 Further, under the
70

Id. at 73.
Id. at 72.
72
Id.
73
Id. See also JONATHAN ADAMS & THOMAS O. MCSHANE, THE MYTH OF WILD AFRICA:
CONSERVATION WITHOUT ILLUSION 73 (1992).
74
Fischer, supra note 2, at 259.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 262.
77
Wolfe, supra note 3, at 7.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 10.
71
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Codes, wildlife was considered ownerless (regardless of where it was found)
until it was wounded, at which point it belonged to the hunter that inflicted the wound.81
The seventh century saw the first establishment of bannforste, or
royal forest preserves.82 Within these preserves, kings employed a practice of “inforestation” that reserved to them the exclusive right to hunt—
a marked departure from the right of free chase codified in the Germanic
Codes.83 Over the course of the next 600 years, German sovereigns extended their control over wildlife to include the hunting of game on vacant
and captured lands.84 Additionally, landowners seeking the protection of
Germanic sovereigns often had to cede to them the hunting rights on
their lands.85 Many of the bannforste created during this period now form
the core of national parks and other formal protected areas.86 In addition
to the bannforste, German kings also established private royal hunting
preserves around their various seats of power.87 In 1640, for instance,
Frederick III, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, created a new game park next to
Gottorf castle in Schleswig, complementing a pre-existing smaller one.88
In 1232, the Sicily-based Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II responded to unrest in the German principalities by confirming the Statutum
in favorem principum (statutes in favor of the princes), which had the effect of conferring much of the Emperor’s rights and privileges, including the
right of inforestation, to the individual German sovereigns.89 These sovereignties eventually used their inforestation powers to preempt all hunting rights throughout the entirety of their territories, preventing hunting

81

Id. at 8.
Id.
83
Wolfe, supra note 3, at 9.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Ingo Mose & Norbert Weixlbaumer, A New Paradigm for Protected Areas in Europe?,
in PROTECTED AREAS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 241, 243 (Ingo Mose ed., 2007).
87
Martina Giese, Continental Royal Seats, Royal Hunting Lodges and Deer Parks Seen
in the Mirror of Medieval Written Sources, in HUNTING IN NORTHERN EUROPE UNTIL 1500
AD: OLD TRADITIONS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, CONTINENTAL SOURCES AND CONTINENTAL INFLUENCES 387, 387 (Oliver Grimm & Ulrich Schmölcke eds., 2011).
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without express permission.90 This expansion of hunting restrictions led
to the establishment of the Jagdregal, a legal institution consisting of two
executive powers: (1) the right of the provincial sovereigns to make any
laws “necessary for the welfare of the state” with regard to wild game and
hunting; and (2) “the jus venandi, the exclusive right to hunt anywhere
within the province.”91
Individual German sovereignties began imposing seasonal hunting
restrictions starting at the beginning of the sixteenth century.92 Even in
season, hunting was considered a noble pastime, with peasants forbidden
from participating or owning firearms.93 The sovereignties also continued
the tradition of creating royal forests, one example of which is a 4,633hectare private hunting ground created by Maximilian II Emanuel, the
elector of Bavaria from 1679–1726.94
The Jagdregal period ended after Germany’s 1848 Revolution, at
which time all landowners were granted the express right to hunt game on
their own property.95 The resultant overhunting, however, led the German
states to later reinstitute restrictions on hunting, a process that accelerated after the creation of the German Empire in 1871.96 Among other
things, these restrictions limited who had the right to hunt, instituted
seasonal bans on hunting, and created hunting districts.97
The 1800s witnessed a growing environmental concern within
Germany. In 1819, Alexander von Humboldt, having previously observed
British informal landscape design, coined the term naturdenkmal, or “nature monument.”98 The concepts of ecology and nature conservation later
appeared in Germany in 1866 and the 1880s, respectively.99 However, despite the growing interest in nature conservation, in 1898 the German
government rejected the idea of creating Yellowstone-style national parks
90
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within Germany because of the perception that the country lacked sufficiently large remaining wild areas and concerns over the removal of large
areas of land from productive use.100
B.

1884–1915: The Creation of a German Colony in Namibia and
the Systematic Disenfranchisement of Native Namibians

Lacking viable natural harbors on much of its coastline, and further insulated by the inhospitable coastal Namib Desert, large swaths of
Namibia remained largely untouched by European exploration until the
mid-nineteenth century.101 England displayed an early interest in the
region, annexing Walvis Bay (the primary port on Namibia’s coastline) in
1878.102 However, in 1883, Germany began aggressively pursuing a colonization effort, beginning with the purchase of approximately 345 square
kilometers of land around Angra Pequena in southern Namibia (subsequently renamed by the Germans as Lüderitzbucht, or Lüderitz Bay).103 By
the next year, Germany had declared as its protectorate the coastline of
Namibia extending nearly 1,000 kilometers northward from Angra Pequena
to Cape Fria near the Angolan border, excluding only the English territory
in Walvis Bay.104 In 1885, Germany also claimed hegemony over inland
areas occupied by the Herero, Nama, and Baster tribes.105
South Africa’s Cape Parliament also claimed control over the
region during this period, voting unanimously in 1884 to annex the lands
south of those controlled by Portuguese in current-day Angola.106 To resolve its territorial disputes with the region’s other colonizers, Germany
entered into treaties with Portugal in 1866 and, via the Anglo-German
Agreement, with England and South Africa in 1890 which, together, established Namibia’s present boundaries, including a 20 mile (32.2 kilometers) wide strip that granted Namibia access to the Zambezi River.107
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Germany sought to establish control over Namibia’s native populations by entering into agreements with tribal leaders in which Germany offered protection in exchange for promises of allegiance.108 While
these agreements were technically treaties between individual sovereigns, international law at that time permitted European Powers to
acquire full sovereignty over any indigenous lands the Powers occupied,
as it was assumed that native Africans were incapable of fashioning a
government that could adequately protect or meet the needs of Europeans.109 As such, after the 1890 treaty, Germany effectively had the de
jure capacity under international law to claim sovereignty over the whole
of Namibia.110
For purposes of this Article, Germany’s colonial interactions with
native Namibians were shaped by two central policies: land allocation and
environmental governance.111 As discussed below, the former policy focused on the removal of Black Namibians from much of the country’s
commercially viable land and the creation of a subjugated labor pool.112
The latter policy focused on warding off a perceived environmental crisis
while providing Germans with a conceptual justification for their takeover of lands utilized by Black Namibians.113
1.

Land Policy: Confiscation for White Settlers

German colonial land policy was guided largely by the singular
idea that indigenous populations should relinquish their grazing and
farmlands for use by white settlers.114 In 1890, a member of the German
Colonial Office made clear the colonizing country’s intent:
The decision to colonise in South-West Africa could after
all mean nothing else but this, namely, that the native
tribes would have to give up their lands on which they had
108
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previously grazed their stock in order that the white man
might have the land for the grazing of his stock.115
The German desire for land was particularly acute given that Theodor
Leutwein (who served as colonial administrator of Namibia from
1894–1904) envisioned the development of the country as a global beef
exporter.116 In order to accomplish this goal, Leutwein called for the development of livestock ranches, 5,000 to 10,000 hectares in size, managed
exclusively by European settlers.117
Germany initially acquired land in Namibia using a divide-andrule approach, employing a combination of force, trade, trickery, and
exploitation (for example, during the rinderpest outbreak in 1897, German authorities provided vaccinations for the livestock of white settlers,
but provided vaccinations for indigenous livestock only in return for
payment, often in the form of livestock or land).118 In 1898, to facilitate
the provision of land to the continuing influx of white settlers into southern Namibia, the German Government issued a decree establishing “reserves” for the resettlement of the country’s Black population.119 By 1903,
over thirty percent of Namibia’s surface area fell under the control of
white settlers.120
The arrival of rinderpest south of the Zambezi River in 1896 led
to a conference of the colonial powers in the British Cape Colony, the
outcome of which was an agreement to prevent livestock and wildlife
from crossing colonial borders and to strictly control the movement of
native Africans.121 Germany, however, lacked the resources to seal off the
entirety of Namibia’s boundaries, and instead focused on cordoning off only
the colony’s north and east.122 The largest of the north’s ethnic groups,
the Ovambo, were armed, organized, and outnumbered the entire population of the area of the country under German control.123 Consequently,
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the colonial government chose to treat the area outside of its de facto
control as a “foreign territory” for purposes of establishing the rinderpest
fence, a decision that resulted in one half of Namibia’s population living
north of the cordon.124 The fence ultimately proved ineffective at preventing the spread of rinderpest, but its construction nevertheless established
a physical demarcation of the edge of Germany’s sphere of influence
within the Namibian colony.125
At the turn of the century, Germany faced a series of armed rebellions by its Black ethnic groups.126 These uprisings occurred, in part,
in response to Germany’s repressive colonial policies, such as the taxing
and confiscation of livestock and horses, and its generally inequitable treatment of indigenous populations and leaders.127 However, the uprisings
were also the result of increasing resource degradation and scarcity on the
native reserves that served to exacerbate the poverty of their residents.128
The Grootfontein launched a short-lived rebellion in 1901.129 The
Bondelwart subsequently rose up in 1903, and their early success caused
Germany to transfer its Namibian-based troops southward to combat the
rebellion.130 The movement of German troops away from Herero lands
spurred them to start their own uprising in January of 1904.131 Unprepared for the Herero rebellion, the German military suffered multiple
defeats in the first half of 1904.132 Germany responded, however, by sending additional troops to Namibia under the command of General Lothar
von Trotha.133
On October 2, 1904, von Trotha issued the now-infamous “extermination order,” which stated that any Herero, including women or children,
found in German territory “with or without a gun, with or without cattle,
[would] be shot.”134 By the conclusion of the Herero rebellion, Germany
had slaughtered approximately eighty percent of the Herero population,
leaving only 15,000–16,000 survivors from an estimated pre-rebellion
124
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population of 80,000.135 Of those survivors, 14,000 were sent to concentration camps where they worked in hard labor.136
A number of Nama tribes started their own rebellions in October
1904, each being met with a similarly ruthless response.137 By the end of
the hostilities, the Nama’s numbers were reduced by half, from approximately 20,000 to 10,000, with thousands also sent to concentration
camps.138 Caught in the middle of the fighting, the Damara also lost
17,000 individuals,139 roughly a third of their population.140
In 1907, the lands occupied by the various rebelling tribes were
officially confiscated as German crown lands.141 The result of that confiscation, combined with Germany’s prior land acquisitions, was that, by
the end of German rule, south and central Namibia (the area under
German control) was “almost devoid of visible settlements, ordered into
neatly fenced-in farms.”142
Because of the costs associated with suppressing the rebellions,
in 1905, Germany instructed Namibia’s colonial government to restrict
its police protection to the smallest possible area.143 In response to this
order, the colonial government established a “police zone,” the northern
boundary of which generally tracked the rinderpest cordon, subsequently
referred to as the “red line.”144 The northern thirty percent of current-day
Namibia remained largely free of German control, with the colonial
governor issuing a 1906 order restricting travel and trade in the Ovambo
region by anyone other than “indigenous” tribes.145 Despite their subsequent attempts to do so, the German colonial authorities simply lacked
the necessary military might to subjugate the Ovambo, who retained a
level of autonomy throughout the remainder of German rule.146
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Environmental Policy: Justifying Indigenous
Disenfranchisement

Compared to the more capitalist approach found in Germany’s
domestic policymaking, its colonial decision-making was highly influenced by a “state and science” collaboration between administrators and
scientists, permitting the development of an autocratic, scientific approach
to policy development.147 Beginning in the late 1800s, policymakers in
Namibia focused on two perceived environmental problems: desiccation
and the overharvesting of wildlife.148 Regarding the former problem,
policymakers were concerned that the misuse of land would lead to altered
rainfall and the drying up of surface water.149 Regarding the latter, colonial administrators, along with interested parties in Germany such as
hunters and members of the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschafgt (German
Colonial Society), were worried that Namibia’s wildlife (or, at least, those
species of wildlife the Germans considered worth preserving) were at risk
of extinction from overhunting.150 Wildlife was viewed as an important
economic resource within the colony, particularly given Namibia’s limited
capacity for agricultural development.151
Policymakers placed the onus for both issues primarily on native
Namibians.152 Colonial authorities blamed, at least in part, variations in
rainfall and water availability on the lack of any environmental ethos
among the Herero and Nama.153 Native Namibians were also viewed as
endangering wildlife by hunting in a manner that was profligate, ignorant,
and unsporting.154 Engaging in what William Rollins describes as “environmental chauvinism,” the perceived excesses of native Africans were
seen as a stark contrast with the environmental ethos and unique scientific and economic capacity of the German settlers.155 This disparity
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provided a reason that “the land itself would be turned against its native
inhabitants: it would cry out in the language of environmentalism to be
relieved from their incompetence, and thereafter would gratefully bear
witness to the care of the colonial masters.”156
The German colonial government sought to control the hunting
of Namibia’s wildlife through the introduction of a regulatory system of
hunting bans and licenses.157 Hunting regulations first appeared in 1892,
requiring would-be hunters to first seek the permission of the colonial governor, and imposing a total ban on the hunting of elephant cows and calves
and a seasonal ban on the hunting of ostriches.158 The first hunting ordinance entered into force in 1902, prohibiting the use of traps or snares
(two hunting approaches traditionally favored by native Namibians),
closing large areas off to hunting altogether, and requiring a permit by all
hunters (both African and European) on lands under government control.159
The German-controlled area of Namibia was divided into districts, each
under the authority of its own district chief who was granted the authority to establish and enforce seasonal hunting restrictions for particular
game species.160
In 1907, the German government established three expansive
game reserves incorporating land protected under the 1902 ordinance.161
The largest of those reserves, which included the modern day Etosha
National Park and was known simply as “Wildschutzgebiet Nr. 2” (Game
Reserve No. 2), covered approximately 80,000 square kilometers—an
area roughly the size of modern-day Austria.162 At the time of its creation,
this reserve was the largest game reserve in the world, although it was
subsequently reduced in size by over seventy percent.163 The other game
reserves encompassed 10,000 square kilometers of the Namib Desert,
and an area in the northeast of the country, respectively.164
156
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Similar nature reserves in East Africa were purposefully designed
to harken back to Jagdregal hunting estates, conveying “the idealized
picture of . . . an untamed wilderness” where the wildlife was referred to
as “imperial game.”165 It is unclear whether the Namibian reserves were
generated with the same nostalgia in mind but, nevertheless, they instituted the same sorts of restrictions as found on Germany’s historical
royal reserves by banning all hunting by German and Bantu-speaking
Africans.166 Only groups such as the Hai//om San were allowed to remain
and hunt within the reserves, as they were viewed as being part of the
natural environment.167
In 1909, the German government adopted a hunting statute that
prohibited hunting without a permit anywhere other than in enclosed,
privately owned lands, and this statute included hunting on native
reserves by Black Namibians.168 The statute also prohibited many forms
of hunting traditionally favored by native Namibians: snares, traps, and
pits.169 Thus, by the end of its rule, Germany effectively removed the
capacity of Black Namibians within the police zone to engage in any form
of legal wildlife governance through land dispossession and the enactment of restrictions on hunting in the areas within which they lived.170
C.

South African Occupation (1915–89): Subjugation, Apartheid,
and the Roots of Community-Based Conservation

After the First World War, South Africa governed Namibia as a
League of Nations mandate.171 However, while the formal colonial ruler
changed, little else did from the standpoint of most Black Namibians.172
For most of its rule, South Africa continued and expanded the German
policy of land disenfranchisement and exclusionary wildlife protection.173
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Land Policy: A Continuation of Germany’s Policy of
Dispossession and Relocation, and the Development of
Traditional Authorities

Like Germany before it, South Africa removed indigenous residents
from their land and allocated it to white settlers.174 Further, South Africa
continued Germany’s policy of relocating ethnic groups within Namibia
to reservations.175 In 1923, South Africa allocated two million hectares in
southern and central Namibia as native reserves176 and forcibly relocated
Black residents found in crown lands to those reserves.177 In addition to
representing only 3.5% of the available land (allocated to ninety percent
of the population), the native reserves were located in the region’s most
barren and least productive locations.178 By 1937, nearly the entire Black
population of the police zone was confined to the reserves, and the movement of Black individuals was strictly controlled by a combination of
curfews and travel, vagrancy, labor, and identification laws.179
South Africa pushed the German-established red line further north
and, in 1915, gained a degree of control over the Ovambo kingdoms in
northern Namibia.180 Unlike with the Germans, however, the focus of
South Africa within the northern region was not land expropriation; instead, its residents were viewed as a source of labor for the white population to the south.181 Consequently, South Africa never opened the land
above the red line to white settlers, and land governance in that region
continued largely in accordance with traditional rules.182
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Meanwhile, forced removals of Black Namibians from land in the
police zone continued.183 In 1958, for example, South Africa relocated four
hundred Damara living near Windhoek to a reserve farther north, with
part of the newly vacated land designated as a game reserve and the
remainder allocated to white settlers.184 In the 1960s, South Africa began
implementing its Odendaal Plan, which envisioned the creation of separate, semi-self-governing “homelands” for each of the Black ethnic groups
within Namibia.185 The conceptualization of ethnic homelands marked a
departure from South Africa’s previous stance, which viewed the reserves
as being open to Black Namibians of all ethnicities.186 South Africa never
fully implemented the Odendaal Plan, and it appears unsettled how
many people were ultimately relocated as a result of the plan.187
These policies (representing the completion of the dispossession
efforts begun by Germany) resulted in a grossly inequitable land distribution.188 In the middle of the twentieth century, white farmers in
Namibia possessed roughly fifty percent of the country’s agricultural
land, while Black farmers (who made up the vast majority of Namibia’s
population) were formally allotted only twenty-five percent, mostly above
the red line in the north.189 At the time of Namibia’s independence in
1990, the percentage of farmland owned by whites—who made up six
percent of Namibia’s population at that time—had increased slightly to
fifty-two percent of all agricultural farmland, while Black residents had
access to the remaining forty-eight percent.190 In total, an estimated 4,205
mostly white-owned southern freehold estates held forty-four percent of
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all available land in Namibia (regardless of suitability for agriculture)
while roughly 160,000 northern Black households occupied forty-three
percent of available land.191
Much of the land occupied by Black households fell under commonproperty ownership, where the allocation of usufruct rights often occurred outside of any formally sanctioned legal procedure.192 South Africa
employed a system of indirect administration that relied on local tribal
authorities, variously referred to as “leaders,” “headmen,” “chiefs,” and
“councilors” (depending, in part, on the esteem in which South African
officials held the particular tribe or group).193 While there may be some
question as to how “traditional” the chosen headmen were within
Namibia’s various tribes, their role as subordinate officials in the political process was clearly entrenched by the time the country gained its
independence.194
In addition to their limited formal de jure powers, the traditional
authorities frequently had much more expansive de facto power within
their communities. For instance, despite the law expressly prohibiting
headmen from allocating land, by reserving that power solely for magistrates and superintendents within the colonial administration, the
traditional authorities effectively did just that.195 Thus, when a resident
in a communal area applied for permission to occupy communal land, the
magistrate or superintendent would seek out and defer to the advice of
the relevant traditional authority.196 Some traditional authorities also
had their own tribal court systems that resolved disputes separately from
the formal South African courts.197

191

Sachikonye, supra note 189, at 66.
Ben Fuller, Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor, at iv–viii (Food & Agric.
Org. of the U.N., Working Paper No. 6, 2006).
193
John T. Friedman, Making Politics, Making History: Chiefship and the Post-Apartheid
State in Namibia, 31 J.S. AFR. STUDS. 23, 28 (2005).
194
ANDREW CORBETT & CLEMENT DANIELS, UNIV. OF NAMIB. SOC. SCI. DIV., LEGISLATION
AND POLICIES AFFECTING COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN
NAMIBIA, 14–15 (1996); Friedman, supra note 193, at 32, 34–35.
195
CORBETT & DANIELS, supra note 194, at 5, 11; WOLFGANG WERNER, “WHAT HAS HAPPENED HAS HAPPENED”: THE COMPLEXITY OF FENCING IN NAMIBIA’S COMMUNITY AREAS
17–20 (2011).
196
CORBETT & DANIELS, supra note 194, at 5, 11; WERNER, supra note 195, at 9, 15, 17.
197
BRIAN T.B. JONES & SIMA LUIPERT, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE CBNRM PROGRAM TO WORK
WITH REGIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES, TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND LINE MINISTRIES
TO FACILITATE INTEGRATED AND COLLABORATIVE SUPPORT TO COMMUNITY-BASED CBOS
WORKING ON COMMON-PROPERTY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 8 (2002).
192

334
2.

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:311

Environmental Policy: The Increased Consolidation of
Governmental Control Over Wildlife and the Beginnings
of CBC

South Africa continued to apply the environmental laws enacted
by Germany, including keeping the nature reserves enacted under the
previous regime in 1902.198 However, in place of an absolute ban on hunting, South Africa allowed the purchase of special hunting licenses within
the reserves.199 During the 1920s, South Africa expanded the scope of
existing import and export regulations on wildlife and placed protections
on certain plant and animal species.200 In 1933, South Africa participated
in the International Conference for the Protection of Flora and Fauna of
Africa.201 Among other things, the parties agreed to establish national
parks and “strict natural reserves” and to afford protection to species
identified in two lists (Class A and B).202 Regarding the listed animals,
the hunting of Class A animals was to be completely banned except for
“special circumstances, solely in order to further important scientific
purposes, or when essential for the administration of the territory.”203
Class B species were afforded a lower level of protection, but still could
not be “hunted, killed, or captured, even by natives, except under special
license granted by the competent authorities”.204 The parties also reserved
the ability to extend the Class A and B protections to additional species
within their respective territories.205
The parties to the 1933 London Convention clarified that the prohibitions regarding the hunting of the identified species did not, as a
matter of course, extinguish hunting rights already possessed by native
Africans pursuant to a treaty, concession, or administrative permission
in “those areas in which such rights [had] already been definitively recognised by the authorities of the territory.”206 The plain language of the
document, however, made no such exception for traditional hunting rights
that had not previously been recognized by the colonial powers (such as
198
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in previously unconquered territory), or in any way prevented parties
from revoking existing native hunting rights.207
Despite its participation in the 1933 London Convention, South
Africa made few substantive changes to its existing conservation policy.208
Eugene Joubert sums up the period from 1915 to the early 1950s as a
“period of stagnation . . . during which time virtually no progress was
made regarding conservation as a whole.”209 He describes Namibia as
simply being too expansive to allow for effective governmental enforcement of hunting restrictions, particularly given that South Africa did not
dedicate any full-time officials to the issue of nature conservation.210
Nevertheless, one seemingly minor policy change is worth discussing
here. In 1919, the colonial government enacted taxes on the ownership
of dogs, although an exception allowed rural white residents to keep one
dog as a watchdog without paying the tax (no such exemption existed for
Black Namibians).211 Black Namibians traditionally used dogs in hunting, and so this seemingly innocuous tax may well have had a significant
and disproportionate impact on the livelihoods of those groups.212
Starting in the 1950s, South Africa began much more aggressively
pursuing nature conservation.213 The period from 1953 and 1972 saw dramatic increases in full-time staff associated with nature conservation and
tourism (from 15 to 593), allocated budget (from R16,000 to R2,112,000),
and formal conservation areas (from 3 to 12).214 These efforts to protect
wildlife coincided with increased restrictions on the utilization of wildlife
by Black Namibians.215 Despite the existence of Germany’s 1909 statute,
the South African government had generally permitted (whether voluntarily or as the result of a lack of enforcement capacity) Black Namibians
to use wildlife resources found on the native reserves.216
The 1950s saw a change to this status quo with the passage of an
ordinance that strictly limited hunting across the country217 and the
207
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eviction of San subsistence hunters from Etosha National Park in the
first half of the decade.218 The ordinance prohibited the hunting of all
game between September and April and prohibited entirely the hunting
of protected or big game without a hunting license (Game Preservation
Ordinance 1951).219 It contained some exceptions for private landowners
and occupiers, providing them with the bounded ability to hunt some
small game and kill game that threatened grazing, crops, or livestock.220
If they had a fenced property, the landowners had unlimited ability to kill
any or all of a number of game species, but no such exceptions existed for
residents of native reserves or common property areas.221 The Game Preservation Ordinance also explicitly banned the use of dogs in hunting and
generally forbade hunting with anything other than a rifle—a hunting
tool that was beyond the financial means of most Black Namibians.222
The strict enforcement of this Proclamation had the effect of ending
subsistence hunting on the native reserves.223
In 1962, the South African government declared all wild game to
be protected, state-owned assets.224 Six years later, in 1968, the government once again returned some rights to private landowners—granting
them the ability to sustainably utilize the wildlife on their properties for
tourism, meat, and trophy hunting.225 Equivalent rights, however, were not
granted to residents on communal lands, so wildlife remained the property of the state in the areas typically occupied by Black Namibians.226
The early 1970s saw a brief decentralization of wildlife governance to regional governments, with the Ovambo and Kavango regional
assemblies passing their own legislation allowing traditional authorities
the ability to hunt certain game and to issue limited hunting permits to
218
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their followers.227 In 1986, however, the Nature Conservation Amendment
Act reconsolidated decision-making and, in the process, repealed the
Ovambo and Kavango legislation.228 The next year, in 1987, the South
African government passed an exemption that allowed the Nyae Nyae
San to engage in “traditional” hunting without a permit.229 Ironically, the
same white apartheid government that granted that exemption also took
great pains to specify what could legally be considered to be the San’s
“traditional” practices—including specifying the length of their bows and
design of their arrows, the materials from which they crafted their snares,
and the method by which they could track down wounded animals (e.g.,
on foot).230 Manfred Hinz astutely notes that this exemption both prohibited the natural evolution of traditions and conflated environmental and
cultural conservation.231
In 1982, the Namibian Wildlife Trust (“NWT”) moved to address the
rampant poaching of black rhinos in the Kunene region—only 66 rhinos
remained from a population estimated to number from 250 to 350 in
1970.232 At this time, the entire governmental staff tasked with patrolling
the 9 million hectares of the Kaokoveld (part of the current-day Kunene
region) consisted of two individuals: a government nature conservator and
his Herero assistant.233 The NWT, through Garth Owen-Smith, a former
governmental agricultural extension officer and game ranger, began discussions with communities regarding issues of wildlife poaching in the
area and the communities’ loss of livestock due to a severe drought.234 The
result of these meetings was the creation of a community game guard in
which members of the local communities patrolled core rhino territory and
whose salaries were paid by the NWT.235 Incidents of rhino poaching
dropped dramatically after the development of the community game
guard, and the approach was subsequently expanded to communal lands
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in Namibia’s northeast Caprivi region.236 After the expansion of the community game guard system to the Caprivi, Owen-Smith and an anthropologist named Margaret Jacobsohn established an NGO, the Integrated
Rural Development and Nature Conservation (“IRDNC”), dedicated to
bringing wildlife benefits to residents in Namibia’s communal areas.237
By the late 1980s, tourism had dramatically increased in the former
Kaokoveld, which, until 1978, had been largely closed to white visitors.238
In response to a rise in tension between the tourists and local residents,
Owen-Smith and Jacobsohn met with stakeholders near Puros, a spring
found in the lower Hoarusib River that served as both a tourist attraction
and an important source of water to local residents.239 As a consequence
of those meetings, tourists were asked to pay a levy of R25 (approximately
$5 at the time) to enter the area.240 The money was provided directly to
the community at Puros, who were able to decide for themselves how it
should be spent.241 The success of this pilot “Puros project” in generating
local support for conservation led to the creation of a second such project
in the Caprivi in 1990.242
D.

Namibian Independence (1990–Present): The Adoption of CBC
as a Conservation Tool and Redress for Inequality

1.

Land Policy: The Continuation of Communally Owned Property
and the Codification of Land Allocation Rights of Traditional
Authorities

Namibia gained its independence from South Africa in 1990.243
While it has engaged in some land reforms, such as reallocating white
freehold estates to Black Namibians, post-independence Namibia has
retained the distinction between the freehold estates and the communalproperty lands.244 It also continues to observe and enforce the red line as
an agricultural barrier.245
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In 1991, the newly independent Namibian government divided
the country into administrative regions as part of an effort to undo South
Africa’s racially oriented “Bantustan” policy.246 Each of these administrative regions is divided into six to twelve local authorities, which function
at the municipality, town, and village level.247 The local and regional authorities have elected councils, with the local authorities each electing
one representative to the regional council.248 The Namibian Constitution,
however, continues to recognize the existence of “customary” law, and
expressly provides that customary and common law is valid to the extent
that it does not conflict with statutory or constitutional law.249
Customary law is determined and administered by “traditional
authorities” which, as defined in the 2000 Traditional Authorities Act
(“the TAA”), consist of a community chief and “senior traditional councilors.”250 Under the TAA, community chiefs are either a member of the
royal family of the traditional community or, if no royal family exists, an
individual selected from within the traditional community.251 The senior
traditional councilors are, at the discretion of the chief, either appointed
by the chief or popularly elected by community members.252 Traditional
authorities are empowered to preside over disputes regarding “any customary matter” between members of the community and exercise other
customary powers.253 The Act limits the scope of the traditional authority’s jurisdiction to members of that community and to non-members that
voluntarily submit (either expressly or by conduct) to the customary law
of the community.254 While the Act differentiates traditional authorities
from what it refers to as “government organs,” it nevertheless provides
246
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for traditional authorities to be remunerated for their services from the
State Revenue Fund.255
The TAA expressly bounds the powers of the traditional authority
by statutory and constitutional law, governmental policies, and the authority vested in regional and local authority councils.256 In practice,
however, these boundaries are not always clear.257 For example, the TAA
(like its predecessor, the 1995 Traditional Authority Act)258 requires that
traditional authorities ensure that their members sustainably use natural resources, but it does not include land allocation amongst the enumerated powers granted to the traditional authorities.259 Nevertheless,
as they had done prior to independence, traditional authorities continued
to allocate land for use by their members after the TAA’s adoption.260
In 2002, Namibia passed the Communal Land Reform Act
(“CLRA”), recognizing the role of traditional authorities in allocating and
canceling customary land rights.261 Yet, at the same time, the language
of the CLRA also potentially constricted this power through the creation
of regional boards to, inter alia, “exercise control” over the practice through
the ratification and registration of land right determinations (and absent
such ratification, the allocation or cancellation has no legally recognized
effect).262 In response to complaints by a number of traditional authorities over the language of the CLRA, the Minister of Lands of Resettlement affirmed that traditional authorities would retain their ability to
allocate communal land.263
2.

Environmental Policy: The Statutory Creation of
Conservancies and the Involvement of Traditional
Authorities in Conservancy Functions

After independence, Namibia’s Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation
and Tourism (the predecessor to the current Ministry of Environment and
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Tourism (“MET”)) worked with Owen-Smith and Jacobsohn to formalize
the game guard and tourist levy approach first adopted in Puros.264 In
1995, the Ministry issued a policy entitled “Promotion of Community Based
Tourism” (“Conservancy Policy”).265 The Conservancy Policy’s stated goal
is to provide “a framework for ensuring that local communities have
access to opportunities in tourism development and are able to share in
the benefits of tourism activities that take place on their land.”266 In
particular, the Conservancy Policy notes the need to enhance the rights
enjoyed by communities over tourism resources.267 It proposes that conservancies are the key to redressing past inequalities and views conservancies as a key tool by which communal residents could gain rights over
environmental resources—particularly wildlife rights—and therefore
attract tourism-related income.268 The Conservancy Policy states that the
MET will support communities’ establishment of conservancies and tourism
ventures.269 It also provides for the channeling of a “substantial share”
of funds for investment in Namibian tourism to communal areas.270
The next year, the Namibian government enacted the Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 (“Conservancy Act”), granting conservancies the same rights enjoyed by the freehold commercial farmers.271
The Conservancy Act provides that any group of people residing on
communal land can apply for conservancy status.272 To be recognized as
a conservancy, applicants must have a registered membership, a legal constitution, a representative management committee, an outline of a benefit
distribution plan, and defined geographic boundaries.273 Once a community is granted conservancy status, it possesses the same de jure rights
as commercial farmers to hunt, capture, cull, and sell huntable game (oryx,
springbok, kudu, warthog, buffalo, and bush pig).274 Furthermore, the
264
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community has the right to apply to the MET for permits to use quotas
of protected game for trophy hunting.275 The Conservancy Act does not
confer any additional rights to the conservancy land itself or to mineral,
fishery, or forest resources located within the conservancy’s territory,276 and
the conservancies’ hunting rights are revocable by the MET Minister.277
As written, the Conservancy Act would appear to allow the conservancies to set their own quotas regarding huntable game.278 However,
based on interviews with traditional authorities and conservancy representatives in the Anabeb, Omatendeka, Puros, and Sesfontein conservancies (conducted in April 2017)279 and informal conversations with
Namibian conservation practitioners (across several visits in 2016–17)
it appears that this is no longer the case.280 It seems that there were
concerns within the Namibian government that the conservancies were
overharvesting wildlife, often by hunting wildlife (or selling wildlife
hunting rights to outsiders) to send to meat processors in cities to the
south.281 Consequently, Namibia’s Ministry of Environment and Tourism
now generates quotas for huntable game for each of the conservancies.282
The Conservancy Act does not expressly provide for the involvement of traditional authorities in the creation or management of the
conservancies.283 Nevertheless, the role of the traditional authorities in
land allocation and dispute resolution means that, in practice, they have
a substantial degree of jurisdictional overlap with the conservancy
administration.284 In recognition of this fact, guidelines promulgated by
the Ministry of Environment and Tourism call for the involvement of
traditional authorities in key areas of the conservancies’ formation and
management.285 Of note, the guidelines observe that “[a]lthough the conservancy legislation and regulations do not prescribe the role of Traditional
Authorities in conservancies, in practice it is important for them to play
275
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a role because of their legal authority in land issues and their duty under
the Traditional Authorities Act to play a role in conservation.”286
The guidelines specify the following roles for traditional authorities:
•

•

•
•

•

Unless specified otherwise in the specific conservancies’ constitutions, individuals are eligible for conservancy membership only if, among other things,
they have resided in the conservancy area for three
years with the permission of the conservancy’s traditional authority.
If a dispute arises that involves the conservancy
committee as a party, the traditional authority is
appointed as a mediator if the parties cannot agree
on another intermediary.
Traditional authorities should be represented on
conservancy committees in an advisory role.
Conservancies should consult with traditional authorities when determining zoning (such as grazing, tourism, or conservation areas) within the
conservancies.
Benefits to the traditional authorities from the conservancies should be stated in the conservancies’
benefit distribution plans.287

Namibia recognized its first conservancies in 1998: the Nyae Nyae and
Salambala in the east of the country and the Torra and gKhoadi-//Hôas in
the western Kunene region.288 As of this writing, eighty-six conservancies
have been gazetted, covering approximately 166,045 square kilometers and
including an estimated 227,941 people (about twenty percent and nine
percent of the country’s total land area and population, respectively).289
E.

Structural Challenges to the Success of the Conservancy Program

The conservancy model is a notable departure from the highly
centralized and exclusionary policies of the German and South African
286
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governments, but its devolution of authority is incomplete.290 First, while
it is subject to procedural limitations set out in the Conservancy Act, the
MET retains the right to withdraw a conservancy’s recognition.291 As
such, the conservancies lack permanent de jure rights to their wildlife
resources.292 Second, the conservancies also lack the de facto capacity to
fully govern those resources, as the MET currently issues permits to the
conservancies for both huntable and protected game.293 Third, despite
their formal recognition by the MET, the conservancies lack any easy
means by which to regulate the entry of outsiders.294
Regarding the lack of permanent de jure rights, in interviews
Carpenter conducted with multiple conservancy authorities and traditional leaders across four Namibian conservancies, no one mentioned the
legal right of the MET to withdraw the recognition of the conservancies.295 Further, no participants in a subsequently administered survey
(involving those same four conservancies) made any reference to the
possibility of revocation either.296 Therefore, it may be that most conservancy residents are either unaware of the possibility or consider the revocation of their conservancy’s status to be highly improbable.297 The mere
legal possibility of the withdrawal of conservancy recognition appears unlikely to have any real impact on the conservancies’ governance function.298
The latter two limitations—the lack of governance privileges and
the inability to regulate entry—are potentially more significant threats
to the success of the conservancy program. Starting with the issue of
governance rights, it appears that residents are very cognizant of the
inability of their conservancies to make their own decisions about wildlife
harvesting.299 The topic frequently arose in interviews of conservancy
representatives and traditional authorities.300 And, in response to a survey
question asking them to identify who owned a range of different species,
less than one third of respondents answered that small herbivores and big
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herbivores (31.23% and 31.5% of respondents, respectively) were owned,
at least in part, by their conservancy (these two sets of animals make up
the “huntable game” identified in the Conservancy Act).301 By comparison, around forty-two percent of participants responded that the animals
were not owned by anyone, approximately twenty-four percent felt that
they belonged to the government, and less than three percent felt that
the ownership was unknown or fell under a different category.302
Whether control over some or all game species should be fully devolved to the conservancies is a matter of debate (it is worth noting that
even conservancy representatives and traditional authorities were split on
this issue in their interviews).303 And, CBC participants can be motivated
to conserve wildlife by a multitude of considerations, including existence
values and the belief that the presence of wildlife benefits the communities
by attracting tourism.304 Nevertheless, the fact that approximately twothirds of survey respondents lack a sense of legal ownership over wildlife
in the conservancies raises a concern that the conservancies fall short in
fostering among their residents a sense of durable interests in wildlife—a
core pillar on which the success of the CBC approach is predicated.305
The inability of the conservancies to exclude outsiders also poses
a challenge to their long-term viability.306 The economic incentives and
self-policing at the heart of the CBC approach is unlikely to modify the
behavior of outsiders who are not integrated into the local communities.307
Absent the ability to regulate entry, the conservancies may struggle to
prevent their wildlife from becoming an open access resource.308 The conservancies can certainly organize patrols to monitor outsiders once they
have entered but, at least in the four conservancies included in this
301
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fieldwork, the patrols are unarmed and lack the legal authority to apprehend suspected poachers.309 As explained by one headman in the Anabeb
conservancy, the patrols can only radio the police and hope they arrive
in time to catch the suspects before they flee.310
The extended drought in Namibia’s north has also caused a number
of Himba pastoralists from the Epupa region to migrate southward into
some of the Kunene conservancies.311 While this Article was unable to
independently verify their claims, conservancy officials, traditional authorities, and survey respondents (excepting the migrants themselves)
all regularly complained about how the “illegal” settlers had moved their
cattle into restricted areas of the conservancies and were competing for
grazing.312 These claims echo those made to other researchers working
in northern conservancies.313 Lacking any other more expedient means
of removing the settlers, the conservancies included in this fieldwork were
forced to turn to the courts, filing an action in 2015 seeking the settlers’
eviction.314 As of late 2019, this Article was not able to find any final
determination of that lawsuit.
A fourth potential hurdle to the overall success of the conservancy
model comes, not from the legal empowerment of the conservancies themselves, but from the symbolism attached to the conservancies as a postapartheid form of empowerment.315 For many communities, a significant
draw behind forming a conservancy was the legal status that accompanied
it—a sense that recognition as a conservancy represented a reclaiming
of land ownership that had long been denied them by the German and
South African governments.316 As a result, despite its creation as means
309
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311
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for affording communal areas the same wildlife management rights as
freehold estates, a number of Namibia’s conservancies actually have
marginal wildlife potential.317
The administration of a conservancy requires expenditures on,
among other things, employee salaries and transportation, and it is unlikely that many conservancies will ever realize sufficient wildlife revenue
to cover their administrative costs.318 Of Namibia’s eighty-six conservancies, less than half (forty-two) have entered into joint ventures with tourism
lodges.319 In 2017, only thirty-nine conservancies reported being able to
cover their operational costs from their own income (out of fifty-four that
provided this information).320 The conservancy program has attracted a
substantial amount of investment from NGOs and foreign agencies over
its lifetime.321 However, external funding is notoriously fickle, as donors
are often tempted to switch their expenditures to support the next “cureall” conservation approach.322 If the conservancy program were to lose a
significant amount of its non-governmental funding, the brunt of the costs
for supporting the conservancies would fall squarely on the Namibian
government.323 At that point, the government would have to choose whether
to continue subsidizing those conservancies that do not have the potential
to become self-sufficient. W. M. Adams and D. Hulme identify this sort of
scenario—where wildlife resources are insufficient to yield a sustainable
revenue flow—as one in which community-based conservation is likely
an inappropriate conservation policy.324
In short, the adoption of CBC in Namibia represents, in several
important respects, a retreat from the paternalistic and increasingly
rigid wildlife management policy utilized by Namibia’s colonial governments. Residents of communal lands now have a legally recognized
interest in their wildlife resources, can elect a committee to make zoning
and governance decisions, and have the potential to profit from wildlifebased goods and services.325 However, this retreat is incomplete and
317
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provides only a partial return to the pre-colonial autonomy enjoyed by
those living in the communal areas.326 This incomplete devolution of rights,
and the marginal potential for many conservancies to realize sufficient
wildlife-generated profits, represent an ongoing challenge to the long-term
efficacy of Namibia’s conservancy model.
III.

COMMON CRITICISMS OF THE CBC APPROACH AND LESSONS
LEARNED

The challenges of the incomplete devolution of rights and the
limited regional economic potential of wildlife are not limited to Namibia’s
CBC efforts,327 and the inability of many CBC efforts to overcome these
and other hurdles give rise to criticism that the approach simply does not
promote either wildlife conservation or economic development.328 For
instance, Piers Blaikie asserts that “a generalized conclusion may be fairly
confidently made that CBC programs in central and southern Africa have
substantially failed to deliver the promises to both communities and the
environment.”329 Skeptics of the approach also commonly contend that
CBC relies on an unrealistic and romanticized concept of “traditional
communities”; commercializes natural resources, which can motivate overharvesting; encourages elite capture, corruption, nepotism, and inequity
at the local level; and is based on unscientific postmodern logic.330 These
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perceived shortcomings have led some critics to call for a reemphasis on
the creation and expansion of protected areas.331 Without minimizing the
critical role that protected areas can play in wildlife conservation, the history of wildlife governance in Namibia cautions against a rush to judgment about the efficacy of any particular wildlife conservation approach.
A.

Success Can Be Subjective and Both Policy “Failures” and
“Successes” Are Valuable Learning Opportunities

Policies are designed to address problems, and their development,
adoption, and implementation can be labor, time, and resource-intensive.
When the policy at issue involves the adoption or amendment of formal
laws, policy failure may be seen as either a political liability332 or a lost
opportunity (given that a new opportunity for adoption may not arise any
time soon).333 For this reason, policymakers can (understandably) be
failure-adverse, sticking to familiar approaches.
Compounding this issue for CBC programs (and many other policies) is the fact that the approach can have multiple, sometimes potentially incompatible, goals, and whether a CBC program is a success or a
failure can often depend on the specific criteria by which it is judged.334
Namibia’s eighty-six conservancies, for example, are expected to not only
sustainably govern wildlife resources, but also to redress inequitable colonial legacies and provide economic opportunities to conservancy residents.335 Residents and stakeholders in Namibia’s conservancies may
tourism, which is an unstable and unreliable source of income; and, due to the presence
of middleman actors, results in the local “producer” receiving only a small and inequitable
portion of the wildlife-generated revenue.
331
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also possess their own informal goals for the conservancies and the
relative importance of these formal and informal goals can vary between
and within stakeholder groups.336 Thus, a conservancy might be considered a success by some stakeholders, perhaps because its creation correlates with a drop in recorded wildlife poaching, while being considered
a failure by others because it fails to generate any material benefits to its
residents. Or, similarly, a conservancy that contains virtually no wildlife
and generates no economic benefits for its residents might still be considered a success by its residents because it provides a level of governmental autonomy that was previously unavailable.337
A policy implementation’s lack of success, however, need not be
viewed as a policy “failure.” For instance, private industry also faces the
risk of failure when innovating, and companies spend significant resources on the development of solutions to problems.338 Yet failures in
private industry attempts at innovation may not be celebrated, but they
are nevertheless expected and accepted as learning opportunities.339
Similarly, when the implementation of a policy fails to realize a particular goal, that lack of success provides guidance for the development or
refinement of future policy.
Environmental problems are often referred to as “wicked problems” because of their complexity, and that complexity means that we
should not expect to realize a uniform set of policy outcomes—either failure
or success. A policy may not achieve the desired outcome on a particular
metric because of any one of multiple natural, economic, or socio-political
factors. Post-evaluation analysis can help to explain why a policy approach has succeeded or failed in a particular set of circumstances, and
this information can be used to create new or modify existing policy that
is better suited to situations on the ground.
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All Wildlife Governance Approaches Have Mixed Records

Namibia’s history evidences the potential shortcomings of both the
CBC and fortress-model approaches. Sub-Saharan governments established (and continue to establish) formal protected areas in modern times
because of the perceived successes of that approach in North America
and Europe.340 However, the creation of protected areas in Namibia and
elsewhere in Africa had profoundly negative impacts on populations residing in, and relying on the resources of, those territories and was part
of a broader disenfranchisement of Black Africans.341 Namibia adopted its
conservancy program, in part, as a means of redressing more than a century of inequitable conservation policy.342 But, the majority of Namibia’s
conservancies struggle to cover their own operating costs and few provide
any meaningful economic benefits to their residents.343 Further, conservancies are limited in their capacity to guard wildlife resources against
the actions of outsiders.344
Yet both the CBC and fortress-model approaches in Namibia have
also had notable successes. Wildlife poaching decreased dramatically in
CBC areas, suggesting that, despite their limitations at excluding others,
the approach may be effective at moderating the behavior of community
residents.345 As for its national parks, Etosha National Park is notable
as having only experienced three incidents of illegal elephant kills (out
of a total of 350 observed elephant deaths) between 2000–19.346
The successes and limitations of the approaches mirror those found
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Carpenter’s study of southern, central,
and eastern Africa found a wide range of successes and failures across
both CBC and centralized governance approaches in protecting African
340
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elephants and other studies comparing governance approaches have
generated equally ambiguous findings.347 Governance approaches may
also be more or less effective at combatting different poaching drivers.348
For instance, CBC may struggle with dealing with organized cells of outside
poachers seeking high value products (such as ivory or rhino horn), but it
may have greater efficacy in deterring locals engaged in subsistence or
small-scale poaching.349 And the converse may also be true, in that the
fortress model may be better at addressing commercial poachers while
proving ineffective (or inappropriate) at addressing small-scale activities.350
C.

There Are No Panaceas in Wildlife Conservation

Others have cautioned against the search for policy panaceas351 and
that warning bears repeating here. Policymakers, stakeholders, and advocates often chase or tout so-called “win-win” solutions: broadly applicable
policy approaches that simultaneously achieve development and conservation goals.352 However, Thomas O. McShane, et al., observe that implemented policies that actually achieve win-win outcomes are the exception
rather than the rule.353 More often, the development of such panacea-type
policies involve an oversimplification of complex socioecological interactions and an under-provision of immediate development benefits.354
Namibia’s conservation history illustrates the potential pitfalls of
this sort of thinking. Colonial governors stereotyped a complex form of
indigenous governance by painting Black Namibians as engaging in profligate resource use and extraction and responded by nationalizing wildlife
and enacting increasingly severe laws on its harvest.355 But those laws
negatively impacted rural Black Namibians and, by removing any sense
347
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of ownership over or responsibility for wildlife, may have actually exacerbated the country’s poaching issues.356
Namibia’s CBC efforts were borne out of the early successes of
domestic pilot programs, and the development of the country’s conservancy program was motivated, in large part, by its potential to realize
both conservation and development goals.357 However, most of Namibia’s
established conservancies have not yet achieved both (or, for some, either)
of those categories of goals.358 For instance, the vast majority of conservancy residents included in Carpenter’s fieldwork stated that the benefits they received from their conservancies failed to match or outweigh
the economic costs associated with living with wildlife.359
Nevertheless, despite their shortcomings, it would be inappropriate to declare either Namibia’s CBC or fortress-model policy approaches
to be abject failures, as both have realized success based on certain metrics.
Rather, it is unlikely that any policy approach could consistently realize
win-win outcomes across the country. The appropriateness of new or
existing policy approaches will likely depend on both the unique mix of
variables in a particular situation and which outcomes policymakers
prioritize. The continued search for win-win panaceas is likely to result
in a discounting of existing policy achievements and repeated “failures”
in the future.

356

Id. at 735.
McShane et al., supra note 331, at 966.
358
Carpenter, supra note 347, at 337.
359
Surveys, supra note 295.
357

